The introduction of this collection of essays by Evelyn Fox Keller begins by noting that the coupling of science and gender sounds odd; Keller dispels this oddity with laudable simplicity: both masculinity and science are socially determined, and the question is, how do they relate? She is right. Sir Francis Bacon, whose influence on the ideology of science is generally admitted to be enormous, saw science as masculine, since it is a hard and serious undertaking leading to Man's domination over Nature; the undertaking and the domination are masculine characteristics par excellence and Nature, therefore, is female. Bacon's view that the proper method of science is to begin with careful observation of the facts of nature is, he repeatedly explains, that of the man who stoops to conquer. To begin an investigation with a hypothesis, on the other hand, is to put Nature into chains.
Keller opposes not only the traditional metaphor, but also the traditional division of the world into Man and Nature: science is a social institution. Keller contrasts this institutional view of science with that which regards the laws of nature as objective. The contradiction is not obvious. Suppose science is an institution and the laws of nature purely objective. It follows that science is not the laws of nature. Keller agrees with Thomas S. Kuhn in rejecting objectivism and settling for relativism. Relativism equates today's science with today's laws of nature, and yields the conclusion that the laws of nature are not purely objective. Yet this sounds like saying that in the nineteenth century Nature obeyed Newton's laws and today Einstein's laws. There is something faintly comic about this. It is much more congenial to say that science approximates the laws of nature, so that Newton's laws look like Einstein's unless one checks carefully, and that Einstein's laws approximate still later theories, so that none of them are purely objective and none of them are the law of nature, so that science is an institution and the laws of nature are purely objective. This is the view of Albert Einstein and Karl Popper about science, and it fits the feminist view of science much more than Kuhn's sexist view of scientific training as severe and authoritarian.
emphasized. Keller Yet she herself is not free from idealizations of science and of the scientific establishment-due to some misunderstandings, presumably-and so there is still much to be done, particularly since Keller does not treat the social sciences and hardly touches on psychology; and there the problems are much more pronounced. Keller's attack on positivism as an idealization of science is valid, yet her choice of an extreme alternative to it, of subjectivism, is disturbing, since subjectivism may easily destroy science, by blocking all criticism because of some subjective feelings.
As to gender discrimination in particular, and as distinct from racial and religious and other discriminations, Keller claims that it hurts science and technology in a particular way-by promoting a macho positivist ideology of hard science and a hostility to nature and the alienation of the subject; in particular gender discrimination hurts real people. On all this she scores some points, yet her subjectivism , her equation of subjectivism with the feminine, and her 'female' science are as objectionable as 'male' science. No doubt science can greatly benefit from the female experience, and from recruiting, encouraging and recognizing women equally with men; above all, science can only benefit from the elimination of all discrimination and bias, all authoritarianism and dogmatism, and all excessive claims of success.
